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I 
If, towards the close of a life which ended in 1676, Sir Matthew 
Hale scribbled into a treatise on the ports of the sea 1 the words 
"affected with a public interest" with an intent of making a great 
contribution to American constitutional law, the records make 
no mention of it. But whatever his meaning and purpose, events 
have conspired to accord to Britain's Chief Justice of the Res-
toration period a share in the authorship of the supreme law of 
the land; for a phrase which hails from a Merry England of a 
quarter-millenium ago has come to be the "established test by 
which the legislative power to fix the prices of commodities, use 
of property, and services, must be measured." 2 It is, accordingly, 
of some interest to inquire into the coming of this ancient phrase 
into the constitution of the new republic, its vicissitudes at the 
hands of the bench, the authority which for the moment it enjoys, 
and the security of its current position. 
On three occasions of late the United States Supreme Court 
has appealed to the "test" of "affected with a public interest" to 
dispose of cases turning upon the power of state legislatures to 
fix prices. A New York statute, aimed at excessive charges by 
brokers, forbade the resale of a theatre ticket "at a price in ex-
cess of fifty cents in advance" of the box-office price.3 A New 
1 A Treatise in Three Parts. "PARS PRI!IL\. Do JuTe Maris. PARS 
SECUNDA. De Portibus Maoris. Pars Tertia. Concerning the Custom of 
Goods imported and exported." From a l'tL\NuSCRIPr OF LORD CHIEF Jus-
TICE HALE in I HARGRAVE, CoLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF 
ENGLAND,1-248 (1787). 
:Mr. Justice Sutherland in Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235, 
239, 49 Sup. Ct. 115, 116 (1929). 
3 Tyson and Bro. v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426 (192.'1). 
1089 
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Jersey statute, leveled at the evils attending trafficking in jobs, 
subjected the fees to be charged by employment agencies to the 
approval of the Commissioner of Labor:' A Tennessee statute, 
designed to secure cheaper motor fuel, conferred upon the Com-
mission of Finance and Taxation the power to regulate the price 
of gasoline.5 In each case the statute was found to "contravene 
the Federal Constitution;" in each case the industries to be 
regulated-traffic in theatre tickets, in human labor, and in gaso-
line-were discovered not to be "affected with a public interest;" 
in each case invalidity was found by resort to Lord Hale's words. 
In each instance the constitution was strictly construed ; the re-
sults were made to rest upon "constitutional principles, applied 
as they are ·written," far too uniform and far too enduring "to 
be remodelled by law-makers or judges to save exceptional cases 
of inconvenience, hardship, or injustice." 6 
An application of a "constitutional principle" as it is "written" 
is no simple and automatic procedure. It has required a long 
line of decisions and a half-century of judicial history to estab-
lish the current rule for the validity of price regulation. The 
verbal prohibition is against "any state" depriving "any person 
of life,. liberty, or property, without due process of law." 1 A 
court, whose members were mature and experienced when the 
Fourteenth Amendment was passed, persisted in established hab-
its of thought. To them the constitution 'vas the old constitution; 
the states might use the police power to promote the general 
welfare.8 Due process of law was a phrase not yet quickened 
into life by interpretation; it took a new generation of jurists to 
recognize its importance and to make explicit the propositions 
hidden within its compact language. But in time it came to be 
seen that the due process clause may be invoked against state 
legislation; that the phrase has reference not only to the manner 
of the taking but also to the thing taken; that "property" con-
tains "rights" 9 which the legislature has no power to abridge or 
4 Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 48 Sup. Ct. 545 (1928). 
5 Williams v. Standard Oil Co., supra note 2. 
6 Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, supra note 3, at 445, 47 Sup. Ct. at 433. 
7 Constitution of the United States of America, Fourteenth Amendment, 
§ 1 (1868). 
8 A clear-cut conception of the dominance of the police power is to be 
found in Mr. Justice Miller's opinion in the Slaughter House Cases, 16 
Wall. 36 (U. S. 1873). The potential meaning of "due process" is vaguely 
suggested in the dissent, particularly in the opinion of Mr. Justice Bradley, 
16 Wall. at 122-123. 
11 For the emergence of the doctrine note, in chronological order, The 
Slaughter House Cases, supra note 8; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 
97 (18j7); San Mateo County v. Southern Pacfic Ry., 13 Fed. 722 (C. C. D. 
Cal. 1882); Butchers' Union v. Crescent City Landing Co., 111 U. S. 746, 
45 Sup. Ct. 652 (1884); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 8 Sup. Ct. 273 
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deny; that freedom of contract is a property right; 1o ana. tnat 
the corporation is a person to be accorded the protection given 
to the individual.n Thus the court came to deny the validity of 
legislation which oversteps its limited constitutional bounds.'= 
In course of time an application of "the constitutional prin-
ciple" has afforded to the making of price an unusual protection 
against legislative interference. In respect to other n:atters of 
contract, the right of the interested parties to make ·what terms 
they will is accorded a limited protection. It must yield before 
a police power invoked in behalf of public safety, public health, 
public morals, or even on occasion that vague thing called the 
public welfare. Thus the legislature may shorten the working 
day/3 insure to the laborer compensation for industrial accident,t• 
prohibit child labor 15 and night work for women, 10 prescribe 
methods of ·wage payment/7 insure the quality of wares offered 
for sale, 18 and provide for the guarantee of bank deposits. 1() But 
freedom of contract in the making of price belongs in a class by 
(1887) ; Chicago, !tlinneapolis & St. Paul Ry. v. l\Iinnesot;1, 134 U. S. 418, 
10 Sup. Ct. 703 (1890). 
10 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 17 Sup. Ct. 427 (1897); Adair 
v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277 (1908). 
11 Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. R., 118 U. S. 394, 6 Sup. 
Ct. 1132 (1886). . 
"
2 In Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 488, 43 Sup. Ct. 597, 601 
(1923), Mr. Justice Sutherland remarks: "The general rule is that neither 
[that is, the legislative, executive or judicial] department may itivade the 
province of the other and neither may control, direct, or restrain the action 
of the other • • • We have no power pe-;· sc to review and annul acts 
of Congress on the ground that they are unconstitutional. • • • The 
power exercised • • • amounts to little more than the negative power 
to disregard an unconstitutional enactment, which otherwise would stand in 
the way of an enforcement of a legal right." The theory is that the court 
does not declare "void," but refuses to enforce, an unconstitutional act. 
The distinction, which is a neat bit of rhetoric, is equally applicable to 
the judicial review of state legislation. 
1a Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 18 Sup. Ct. 383 (1898) ; Bunting v_ 
Oregon, 243 U. S. 426, 37 Sup. Ct. 435 (1917). 
B New York Central Ry. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 37 Sup. Ct. 247 (1917); 
Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 37 Sup. Ct. 260 (1917); 
Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U. S. 400, 39 Sup. Ct. 553 (1919)-
~~ Sturges & Burn v. Beauchamp, 231 U. S. 320, 34 Sup. Ct. 60 (1913). 
'16 Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 44 Sup. Ct. 325 (1924). 
'17 Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13, 22 Sup. Ct. 1 (1901) ; 
McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539, 29 Sup. Ct. 206 (1909). 
:1s Hipolite Egg Company v. United States, 220 U. S. 45, 31 Sup. Ct. 364 
(1911); .AJ.-mour & Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U. S. 510, 36 Sup. Ct. 440 
(19,16) ; United States v. Forty Barrels and Twenty Kegs of Coca-Cola, 
241 U. S. 265, 36 Sup. Ct. 573 (1916); United States v. Johnson, 221 U. S. 
488, 31 Sup. Ct. 627 (1911). But see Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 
U. S. 402, 46 Sup. Ct. 320 (1926), in which the court found invalid n 
statute of Pennsylvania forbidding the use of "shoddy'' in manufacturing_ 
19 Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 186 (1911). 
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itself; a statute intended to abridge the rights of the high con-
tracting parties to agree upon 'vhat compensation they will must 
meet an extra constitutional hazard. It is to be found valid only 
in an industry "affected" or in a business "clothed" with "a public 
interest." 20 
It has thus come about that a train of propositions stretch 
away from the simple words of "the due process" clause to the 
ultimate "test" 21 of "public interest." They are, each and every 
one of them, essential to a judgment of invalidity upon price 
regulation. Take away a single one and the argument of uncon-
stitutionality cannot march to its conclusion. Such, in the safe-
guarding of market price against the action of the state, has 
been the course of "constitutional principles applied as they are 
written." 
II 
The knack of putting up new wine in old bottles is one of 
the most valuable tricks of the judicial trade. It may keep law 
backward by crowding stuff of a newer world into an outworn 
term which was never intended to hold it; it may serve a living 
law by permitting a graceful accommodation of a vocabulary 
that endures to the shifting exigencies of a developing society. 
Its use is neither good nor bad in itself; it depends upon the 
crudeness or the skill, the blindness or the awareness, with which 
the feat is accomplished. The practice of the judicial art could 
hardly go on without it. The survival of the term "affected with 
a public interest" is in large measure due to the ease with which 
it is adapted to a changing common sense and judicial opinion. 
The term was coined by Sir Matthew Hale towards the end of 
the third quarter of the seventeenth century. The essay in which 
it appears remained in manuscript for more than one hundred 
2o It is necessary to distinguish between "public interest" and "affected 
with a public interest." Public interest is a general term connoting 
matters which legally are of common concern; "affected with a public 
interest" has come to be a technical term belonging to the vocabulary 
of constitutional interpretation. An example of the broader usage is to 
be found in Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. (N. s.) 140 (1837), in which a rather 
belated assize of bread is found not to be "contrary" to the constitution 
of the state. An example of the narrower usage is Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 
supra note 3. 
21 The term "public interest" is employed by the court in cases relating 
to such matters as eminent domain, taxation, and price-fixing. It would 
be interesting, but beyond the scope of this article, to inquire into the 
meaning which it has come to have in respect to each of these subjects. 
Here the discussion is limited to the "public interest" which is the test 
of legislative price-fixing. 
An excellent discussion of the judicial use and the economic significance 
of "public interest" as related to price-fixing is to be found in KEEzER AND 
MAY, THE PUBLIC CONTROL OF BUSINESS (1930) 97-163. 
HeinOnline  -- 39 Yale L. J. 1093 1929-1930
1930] AFFECTATION WITH PUBLIC INTEREST 1093 
years, almost unnoticed; it was published in the very year in 
which the Constitution of the United States was set down on 
parchment.:!:. In the early part of the nineteenth century the 
phrase was quoted and the essay cited by the English courts.23 
In 1837 an erudite justice of the 'C'nited States Supreme Court, 
in a treatise packed with learning, which is at once an essay on 
the nature of the constitution and a series of separate opinions, 
refers to the treatise but fails to quote the phrase.=• In the Munn 
case/5 argued in the year that marked the bicentennial of Lord 
Hale's death and the centennial of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, the phrase was given currency and started upon its legal 
adventures.2~'~ In the Wolff case :!t it emerges definitely as the 
"constitutional principle" applicable to price regulation. 
In the passage in Lord Hale's essay, in which the phrase is 
first used, there is little to attract unusual attention. In a distinc-
tion between public and private wharves, the author insists that 
"a man" who "for his own private advantage" sets up a wharf 
or a crane "may take what rates he and his customers may 
agree;" but at a wharf unto which all persons. must come to 
unlade or lade their goods "there cannot be taken arbitrary or 
excessive duties," but "the duties must be reasonable and moder-
ate." The reason is that "now the wharf and the crane and other 
conveniences are affected with a publick interest, and they cease 
to be juris p-rivati only." :!s 
It is difficult to find here a criterion for price-fixing or even a 
clear-cut rule of law. Instead, the meaning seems to be insepar-
:!2 An e.xcellent account of the history of the manuscript and of the 
judicial use of the doctrine is to be found in ~IcAllister, Lord Hale cnzd 
Business Affected u·ith a Pttblic Interest (1930) 43 HARV. L. REV. 759. 
23 Bolt v. Stennett, 8 T. R. 606 (1800); Allnutt v. Inglis, 12 East 527 
(1810). 
24 In the concurring opinion of lir. Justice Baldwin in the case of 
Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Peters 420 (U.S. 1837). The 
opinion appears as a section of A GE:SERAL VIEW OF THE 0RIGI~ A:."D 
NATURE oF THE Co~STITT;·no~ A:O."D GoVER."'ME:-."T OF THE U:SIT£0 STATES. 
whi.ch was published at Philadelphia in 1837, and is reprinted in 9 L. Ed. 
868. The references to Lord Hale's essay are at pp. 938-955. 
::~ ~l:unn v. Illinoi£, 94 U. S. 113 l1877). 
2s The dates which mark cite progress of the doctrine are interesting, 
1676, 1876, 1887. It is perhaps a bit more significant that the first date 
precedes, and the second follows by a century Adam Smith's Wealth of 
Nations (1776). In this book is to be found the beginnings of a philosophy 
of economic individualism, in terms of which Lord Hale's ph~e was a 
century and a half later to be interpreted. 
21 Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations of Kansas, 2G2 
U. S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630 (1923), 267 U. S. 552, 4G Sup. Ct. 441 (1924). 
:.s S1tpra note 1, at 77-78. Little is added by the quotation of the \'i"hole 
passage. Readers to whom HARGRA\-"E, TRACTS is not accessible will find it 
in Munn v. Illinois, supra note 25, at 127, or in McAllister, op. cit. suprn. 
note 22, at 764. 
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able from the subject under discussion, the common-sense which 
then prevailed, and the accepted notions about price control. The 
lines occur in a paragraph set in an orderly and comprehensive 
discussion of the ports of the sea; the passage is concerned with 
a division of that larger subject. It defines public whanes; finds 
them to operate by the King's license; recognizes their monopoly 
character; and notes the limitations imposed upon their charges. 
In their context, and against the background of custom and 
thought, the meaning of these simple words is not far to seek. In 
the days in which English industry was largely domestic, the 
production and use of most goods was untouched by trade. Where 
wares and services came to market, and in a public place were 
bought and sold, it was the ordinary thing for prices to be fixed 
by Parliament, or in the absence of a statute by justices of the 
peace.29 In the disorder attending and following the civil wars 
many an ancient usage was relaxed; and "cranage, wharfage, 
and pesage," unchecked by the government, may have become 
extortionate charges. Although authority had not the strictness 
of Elizabethan days, the prevailing notions of what should be 
remained as they were. In Lord Hale's time, however laxly the 
laws were en!orced, all activity comprehended under what today 
we call business, was public, and all of it subject to price con-
trol.30 The words may be a sanction for prosecution for extor-
tion even when prices are not authoritatively fixed; 31 they may 
be an admonition lest the ancient law be forgotten; they are most 
likely only a statement of a legal ideal to which usage is supposed 
to conform.32 
But, ·with whatever meaning historical scholarship may endow 
the phrase, it is clear that here is no "test" for legislative price-
fixing. If "conveniences" like cranes and wharves are "affected 
with a public interest," it does not follow that a like cloak must 
be thrown about trades and callings to bring their prices under 
control. It is quite impossible to find in Lord Hale's sentences a 
standard by which is to be measured a price regulation whose 
legality and economic soundness had not been questioned ; or to 
discover there a limit to legislative discretion in a country in 
which even to this day Parliament decides for itself how far it 
may go in the control of industry. In law, as elsewhere, ques-
tions are not formally answered before they are asked. 
29 The price of coal in London is fixed as late as 1664 by 16 Car. II, 
c. 2, "An Act for regulating the measures and prices of coals." 
39 Adler, Business Jurisprudence (1914) 28 HARV. L. REV. 135. 
31 The writer has been permitted to read an unpublished manuscript 
of Mr. J. A. McLean, concerned with the concept of public interest. After 
a careful study of Lord Hale's essay and the economic documents of the 
period Mr. McLean concludes that it was an invitation to the judicial 
determination of "wharfage" even in the absence of statutory authority. 
32 McAllister, op. cit. supra note 22. 
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A lapse in usage helps a legal term to acquire a fresh meaning. 
The two centuries which elapsed between the scribble in an Eng" 
lish country home and the plea of an Illinois la·wyer in a Wash-
ington court room enabled the phrase to rid itself of a seven-
teenth century content and to take on a mid-nineteenth century 
meaning. As trades gave way to businesses, and production for 
the market began to be the rule, price came to be of great con· 
cern in a rising industrial society. In time dissatisfaction with 
prices established in the market \vas inevitable; sooner or later 
the persons who thought they were paying too much or getting 
too little would appeal to the state. The demand to curb large 
corporations, particularly those which intervened between pro-
ducers and consumers, came to a head in the Granger movement. 
In the grain belt, state after state attempted to bring large-scale 
business under governmental control. Illinois fell in line; the 
legislature, prompted by the farmers and other good people of 
the state, decided to regulate the charges of grain elevators. 
Members of the trade objected, insisted that the legislation was 
invalid, and took the issue into the courts. 
A rising business system and a written constitution were al-
most certain to create for the control of prices a distinctive doc-
trine. But it was by the merest chance that the phrase "affected 
with a public interest" came into that eminence. In illinois, 
1\funn and Scott, who had elected to try the issue at law, lost 
their case; the state supreme court 13 found the grain elev.ators 
to be engaged in "public employment;" it insisted that since they 
were not to be taken from their owners there was no deprivation 
of property. The case was appealed; 34 and the learned counsel 
for plaintiffs-in-error presented to the United States Supreme 
Court a novel, erudite, and ingenious argument. They invoked 
the protection of the due process clause; insisted that this phrase 
was to be interpreted in the light of the common law; represented 
Lord Hale as a great authority upon that subject; cited his 
treatise upon the ports of the sea for the rule on price regulation; 
declared its meaning to be a limitation of legislative action to 
businesses "affected with a public interest;" and denied that grain 
elevators wer~ anywhere to be found within that· catalogue.:s:~ 
It is almost certain that had Munn's attorneys not called the 
attention of the court to the neglected essay, Lord Hale's phrase 
would not have been used; it is quite beyond doubt that in any 
event the Illinois statute would have been upheld. But here was 
33 Munn v. People, 69 Til. 80 (1873). 
34 Munn v. Tilinois, supra, note 25. 
3s For many of these details the writer is indebted to the thorough study 
of the record and briefs in the case made by 'Mr. De:<ter M. Keezer, now 
a member of the editorial staff of the Baltimore Sun. See also KEEzER A-''D 
.MAY, op. cit. supra, note 21, at 123-125. 
HeinOnline  -- 39 Yale L. J. 1096 1929-1930
1096 YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39 
a gift of an argument much too useful to be rejected .. So Mr. 
Chief Justice \Vaite, with a rare impartiality, accepted the rule 
of lav .. · from the plaintiffs-in-error, affected grain elevators with 
a public interest, and handed the decision to the state of Illinois. 
But the issue is not as simple as all this. In an opinion marked 
rather by common-sense "than by clean-cut reasoning a doctrine 
of public interest is at best to be found only in embryo. In a 
constructive argument the Chief Justice rests the validity of the 
legislation squarely upon the police power, makes no distinct~on 
between price-control and other forms of regulation, and finds a 
sufficient excuse in the strategic position of elevators which 
stand at the gateways of commerce and take their toll. In any 
event he would doubtless have attempted to find a word com-
parable to public health, public safety, and public morals, to 
justify and particularize the use of the police power. But beyond 
a short specific statement he would probably not have gone but 
for the temptation offered by learned counsel. He attempts a re-
joinder to their use of Lord Hale's rule, is captivated by the neat-
ness and relevancy of the phrase, and passes from rebuttal to af-
firmative utterance. He reads into the words the power of the 
legislature to regulate "a business in which the whole public has 
a direct and positive interest;" 3~ and gives a flourish to his argu-
ment by the figure of devotion to "public use." 37 In his thought 
the phrase is still a generic term of common law, on all fours with 
"public morals,'' "public safety," and "public health;" it has not 
yet become a technical term in the vocabulary of constitution-
ality.35 In a shorter opinion Waite could have reached his conclu-
sion without benefit of Lord Hale's phrase; ~9 in the longer one 
his use of it does not quite make his argument march. 40 In short 
ac :Munn v. Illinois, supra note 25, at 133. 
a; Ibid. 126. 
s& To the writer it seems that Mr. Justice Field had a much clearer 
appreciation of the novelty which had been brought into constitutional law 
than had Mr. Chief Justice Waite. In fact, by the specific attention 
directed to it, he comes very near to disassociating "public interest" from 
"the police power" and making_ a doctrine of it. 
39 A harsh critic is likely to point out many puzzles in the opinion; a 
generous one "cannot escape pointing out a Jack of economy in judicial 
statement. An argument that the legislation is a proper exercise of th~ 
police power is enough to support the conclusion of constitutionality; a 
reasoned rejection of Lord Hale's rule as implicit in due process is ~noug-h 
to refute the contention of unconstitutionality. It is when he does the 
superfluous, and argues positively that grain elevators are affected with a 
public interest, that he opens the door to a new doctrine and im·ltes a 
protracted discussion of his unnecessary words. 
40 It seems to the writer that a great deal of the discussion of Waite's 
opinion has been beside the point because the opinion has been read without 
reference to the briefs. An oversight of the occasion for Waite's dis-
cussion of Lord Hale has led students and courts alike to accept as part 
of the positive argument a discussion which was intended to be a rejoinder 
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the Chief-Justice reads and expounds Lord Hale with a mind 
filled with the decisions of a court dominated by the spirit of 
Taney. He tears a fragment from the annals of the law, strips 
away its specific reference to wharves, and recreates it in the 
likeness of the police power. 
But "public interest" could hardly escape positive judicial use. 
Along with the lJ.funn case came others which gave occasion to 
extend the concept and to narrow its meaning. The notorious in-
stance of evils in the wake of uncontrolled price was the railways; 
the problem of the regulation of rates was imperative. In dispos-
ing of these cases the Chief Justice throws a cloak of public in-
terest about "carriers for hire." So like in his mind were rail-
roads to grain elevators that a restatement of his argument was 
not demanded; it is enough to refer back to the 1\Iunn case;61 In 
time "public use" helped the law of public utilities to a promising 
start; in doing so the general language of the opinion was neatly 
chiseled to make out a specific case for interference.~:! A few 
lines in which Waite translates Lord Hale's sentences into a 
formula of control for a coming industrialism were found to be 
quite in-point. He declares, properly enough, that "property" be-
comes "clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to 
make it of public consequence, and affect the community at 
large." He insists that, when "one devotes his property to a use 
in which the public has an interest, he, in effect. grants to the 
public an interest in that use." Thus "public use" becomes the 
invitation to regulation; and the grantor "must submit to be 
controlled by the public for the common good, to the e:....-tent of 
the interest he has thus created." ~ 3 In isolation from the opinion 
these sentences invite a development of a doctrine of public in-
terest in terms of the use of property.44 But if a concern with 
the railroad problem tended to identify public interest with public 
to counsel. Here a separation of holding from dicta, as they have been 
set down by interpreters, invites an interesting study in the judicial proc-
ess. Had it been so read the opinion could not have been cited in support 
of decisions declaring legislative price n....,.ing invalid. Its future would in 
all probability have been that of the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 
(U. S. 1873). 
u It is likely that it was the necessity for dealing with the railroad 
cases that caused Waite to pass from a rejoinder to ?!Iunn's attorneys to 
a positive utterance about public interest. The disposition of the lotunn 
case does not demand it; but it makes of that case a precedent which can 
be made to control the decisions in the railway cases. 
~z Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155 (1876) ; 
Peik v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 94 U. S. 164 (1877) ; and following 
cases. 
43 Munn v. Illinois, supra note 25, at 126. 
~Ruggles v. Illinois. 108 U. S. 536, 2 Sup. Ct. 832 (1882); Spring 
Valley Water Works v. Antone Schottler, 110 U. S. 347, 4 Sup. Ct. 48 
(1884); Dow v. Beidelman, 125 U. S. 680, 8 Sup. Ct. 1028 (1888). 
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use, the concept was narrowed in the name of the power of the 
state to control. 
For a time the association of "public interest" with "public 
use" made no bother. Casually or carefully, the phrase had been 
used; it ceased to be a prop to the police power and began to take 
on a meaning of its own; the end of public interest began to be 
the rule of Public Interest. So long as cases concerned grain 
elevators the M-unn decision was in point and the magic of the 
,,·ords was enough. Monopoly had been used to affect grain ele-
vators with a public interest,45 but contagion carried the affec-
tation to elevators which had to compete with their kind for 
trade. As the police power waned, the crude lines of the new 
doctrine assumed form. By 1892 "no general power resided "in 
the legislature to regulate private business," or "to fix the prices 
of commodities or services," or "to interfere with freedom of 
contract." But to the New York Court of Appeals 46 and to the 
United States Supreme Court •r alike, an exception was an excep-
tion, and an act providing maximum charges for handling grain 
in elevators, aboard ocean lines, and on canal boats was found 
valid. For "there might be special conditions and circumstances" 
bringing the business "within principles which, by common law 
and the practice of free governments," justifies "legislative con-
trol and regulation in the particular case." 48 In 1894, two years 
later, a North Dakota statute was upheld which imposed price 
regulation by converting private into public elevators. •v 
It is not easy to hold legal doctrines in the service of the 
causes which call them into being. In the whole history of price 
regulation the most paradoxical of cases is that of the German 
AUW.nce Insurance Company.~o A statute of Kansas sought to 
regulate the rates to be charged for insurance against fires. It 
seemed clear to the court that the business was affected with a 
public interest; in terms of common sense the issue was clear 
enough; insurance was a matter of general concern; since estab-
lishments generally must have it, the business interlocked with 
many others ; in the making of terms the insured and the insurers 
were in unequal bargaining positions. But the language which 
the court had been employing was stubborn and could not be 
easily fitted to so peculiar an industry. The business was not like 
a railroad; there was no charter or franchise; the attribute of 
monopoly was not to be discovered; it was not easy for the judi-
45 But see McAllister, supra note 22, who insists that an invocation 
of monopoly is not an essential part of Waite's argument. 
4 6 People v. Budd, 117 N.Y. 1, 22 N. E. 670 (1889). 
47 Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517, 12 Sup. Ct. 468 (1892). 
48 People v. Budd, supra note 46, at 15. 
49 Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U.S. 391, 14 Sup. Ct. 857 (1894). 
so German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Kansas, 233 U. S. 389, 34 Sup. Ct. 
612 (1914). 
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cial eye to discern property devoted to a public use. In an in-
genious opinion Mr. Justice McKenna drives,. an argument past 
obstacles of language to a triumphant conclusion. He disen-
tangles public use from public utilities; restores to the plu-ase 
Waite's meaning, and makes the criterion serve his purpose. He 
explains the language of the Munn case: "In other words that 
which had been private property had from its use become, it was 
declared, of public concern, and the compensation to be charged 
for its use prescribed." In broadening the concept of public use, 
Mr. Justice McKenna takes from property its major role. To 
him, "it is the business which is the fundamental thing; property 
is but its instrument, the means of rendering the service which 
has become of public interest." :u 
In thus affecting insurance with a public interest l\Ir. Justice 
McKenna makes over the "standard." He refuses to give up the 
criterion of property devoted to public use; but he makes the con-
cern of the business to the public the heart of the matter. In 
his opinion the sanction goes directly back to the law of common 
callings and the subject is placed within the province of trade 
regulation where historically it belongs. The result is a general, 
if indefinite, invitation to the legislature to extend price control 
where public concern demands it. With the help of the word 
"emergency," a rent law, passed as a war-time measure was 
found valid.s2 Affectation might have been e::-..-tended to other 
industries; but a change in the personnel of the court made 
inevitable another interpretation. The opinion of M:r. Justice 
McKenna still remains in the records though today it is cited 
by the court only to be distinguished. It is an anomaly that a 
statement most in accord with the common law has had least 
influence on the course of decision. 
III 
A new chapter in the fortunes of Lord Hale's classic phrase 
begins with the third decade of the twentieth century. The 
Supreme Court, as reconstituted in 1921-1923, found an unusual 
opportunity to establish and interpret a rule of law for the valid-
ity of price-fixing legislation. In four cases, which differed 
greatly from each other, and involved industries as distinct as 
brokerage in theatre tickets, running employment agencies and 
selling gasoline, the issue was squarely before it. The work of 
the court is marked by a formal recognition of "affectation \\ith 
public interest" as a definite test of constitutionality and by 
a labored attempt to make the indefinite phrase a definite cri-
terion. But, if the court may affect, i~ may refuse to affect; if it 
sJ.fbid. 408, 34 Sup. Ct. at 617. 
52 Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458 (1921). 
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may throw about an industry the cloak of public interest, it may 
refuse the covering of that protective garment. It is significant 
that in this period a phrase brought into constitutional law to 
sanction price-fixing is consistently used to outlaw price-fixing. 
In the Wolff case, 53 the first to come before the new court, the 
question at issue was the validity of a Kansas act providing for 
compulsory arbitration and determination of wages in industries 
concerned with the provision of food, clothing, and fuel. The act 
contained many novelties in legislation, bristled with constitu-
tional issues, and presented numerous invitations to a declara-
tion of unconstitutionality. For purposes of wage~fixing at least, 
a unanimous court refused to affect meat-packing with a "pubhc 
interest." The decision is in no sense surprising; the opinion is 
of note because of a heroic and labored attempt to reduce a vague 
concept to a specific rule of la,,·.54 
The elaborate criteria laid down by Mr. Chief Justice Taft fall 
just short of being useful. He resolves the group affected with a 
public interest into three classes: (1) industries "carried on 
under the authority of a public grant or privilege" which imposes 
"the affirmative duty of rendering a public service"; (2) "certain 
occupations regarded as exceptional, the public interest attaching 
to which has survived"; and (3) "businesses which though not 
53 Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, supra note 27; Rab-
inowitz, The Kansa.s Industrial Court Act (1923) 12 CALIF. L. REV. 1. 
54 An appeal from law to economics is here of no avail; a survey of the 
industrial system does not reveal the necessary standard. An "order" 
which is a loose aggregate of interdependent industries, each of which holds 
itself out to serve all who may come and who have the price, does not 
permit the drav>'ing of a hard and fast line. It is not easy to separate 
into public and private an aggregation of businesses which differ from each 
other in structure, in operation, in importance, and in the ways of their 
control. No obvious labels mark out certain .ones as subject to regulation 
and others as beyond the reach of the legislative hand. Size will not do; 
size is evidence neither that prices ·will get out of order nor that an appeal 
to the state may be made to help the matter. The planting of cotton, 
the retailing of groceries, and the supplying of building materials are 
among the greater industries; yet with the price-structure of none of them 
is the government likely to be called upon to interfere. Nor will the 
importance of the product serve the purpose; there is little evidence that 
the price of bread, of clothing, of medical service, or of the talkies needs 
to become a matter of legislative concern. Nor will the strategic position 
of the industry suffice. The growing of cotton is the first in a succession 
of industrial processes; the mining of coal keeps an industrial system 
going; and the smelting of pig iron makes the machine process "possible. 
Yet in none of the three is price regulation among the probabilities. The 
storage of grain and insurance against fires, great and important as 
they are, are smaller in size, perform less important services, and are 
no more thoroughly intertwined with other businesses. In an industrial 
system, whose lines are not black and white, such criteria throw little light 
either upon the need for price control or upon the capacity of regulation 
to afford relief. 
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public at their inception may be said to have risen to be such." ~) 
The first group consists of industries now clearly recognized as 
public utilities; the right of the state to obtrude its will into their 
affairs is beyond dispute; to that end the use of a distinct doc-
trine of public interest is quite unnecessary. The second group 
is a historical survival; here the rightfulness of control is a 
matter of judicial tolerance. However it came about in the first 
place, "inns, cabs, and grist mills" are not at this late day to be 
disaffected of public interest.56 The third group consists of busi-
nesses whose tangled affairs may come to demand public atten-
tion: It clearly excludes public service industries and includes 
far less than the whole of business. The marks of public interest 
a1·e "the indispensable nature of the service," "the e.xorbitant 
charges," and the "arbitrary control" which is possible "without 
regulation." .s7 But, except for marking out a rather indefinite 
zone, the discussion is singularly barren of a rule of affectation. 
The industries which belong here are not marked; the legislature 
may not affect as it will; the court cannot reduce its e.xercise of 
discretion to clear-cut terms. In short, price regulation is sanc-
tioned where it is established, invited in public service indus-
tries, and threatened with an arbitrary judicial disapproval in 
-ordinary trade.58 
In the three later cases a divided court refused to e.'\.-tend affec-
tation with public interest beyond its current industrial bound-
aries.59 In the Tyson case,60 the court refused to declare that 
"every public exhibition, game, contest, or performance, to which 
an admission charge is made, is clothed with a public interest, 
so as to authorize a law-making body to fix the maximum amount 
of the charge its patrons may be required to pay." 61 Accordingly 
ss Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, supra. note 27, 
at 535, 45 Sup. Ct. at 632, 633. 
ss In the law of the constitution, as elsewhere, ''bygones are bygones." 
But if to "inns, cabs, and grist-mills," constitutional principles were ap-
plied as recently thr:y have been applied, it is hard to see bow currently 
they could be affected with a public interest. 
s•· Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, supra. note 27, 
at 538, 45 Snp. Ct. at 634. 
ss Keezer, Some Questions Involved in the Application of the "Public 
btterest:' Doctrine (1926) 25 MICH. L. REv. 596. 
ss In the Tyson case the vote was five to four, Stone, Holmes, Brandeis, 
and Sanford, J.J., dissenting; in the Ribnik case, si.x to three, Sanford, J., 
being unable to distinguish the case from the Tyson case, and voting with 
the majority; in the Williams case, eight to one, Holmes, J., alone dis-
senting and Brandeis and Stone, J.J., concurring in the result. 
60 Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, supra. note 3. 
sl Ibid. 429, 47 Sup. Ct. at 428. M:r. Justice Stone insists: "The ques-
tion •.• is much narrower than the one which has been discussed by the 
Court. It is not whether there is constitutional power to fi..x the price 
which theatre owners and producers may charge for admission • • . • The 
statute . . • prohibits the licensed ticket broker, an intermediary in the 
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it held invalid a law forbidding dealers in theatre tickets to resell 
them to customers for a charge which is more than fifty cents in 
advance of the box-office price. In the Ribnik case/2 it was for-
gotten that the broker is "a mere appendage of the theatre," 03 
it was discovered that the Tyson case decided that brokerage was 
not affected with a public interest, and it was set down that "the 
business of securing employment for those seeking work and em-
ployees for those seeking workers is essentially that of a 
broker." 64 It followed, as of course, that a New Jersey Act which 
went only so far as to provide for an official supervision of fees 
to be charged working men for placing them in jobs was invalid.0~ 
In the Willia.'ms case,S6 it was held that gasoline, which is one of 
"the ordinary commodities of trade" is "in no essential aspect" 
different "from the great variety of articles bought and sold;" 
that "the decisions of the court" which control this case, "make 
it perfectly clear that the business of dealing in such articles" 
does not "come within the phrase 'affected with a public inter-
est;' " 67 and that a Tennessee statute providing for regulation 
of the price of gasoline is repugnant to the constitution. 
But if the results are certain, the criterion by which the court 
refuses to affect with a public interest is far from definite. The 
justice who speaks for the court reads the law as he finds it writ .. 
ten. He chooses to stand upon the decision of the court in the 
Munn case. But he does not summarize Waite's argument, deter-
mine the holding, or untangle the reason for it from the elaborate 
essay in which it is set. Instead, in all three opinions, Mr. Justice 
Sutherland seizes upon the paragraph of dicta which is concerned 
with the "devotion" of "property" to "public use." 68 He reverts 
to an interpretation of the question as concerned with the use of 
property rather than the regulation of trade. But his conception 
of public use is neither that of Waite nor of McKenna. He ac-
cepts grain elevators and insurance as "affected with a public 
interest," and formally makes the category broader than public 
service industries by admitting property put to a "constructive" 
marketing process, from reselling the ticket at an advance of more than 
fifty cents above the printed price." Ibid. 448-9, 47 Sup. Ct. at 434. 
62 Ribnik v. McBride, s-upra note 4. 
63 Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, supra note 3, at 429, 47 Sup. Ct. at 428. 
64 Ribnik v. McBride, supra note 4, at 356, 48 Sup. Ct. at 546. 
6s See Comment (1928} 38 YALE L. J. 225. 
66 Williams v. Standard Oil Co., supra note 2. 
6~ Ibid. 240, 49 Sup. Ct. at 116. 
6 8 Tyson v. Banton, supra note 3, at 433, 47 Sup. Ct. at 429; Ribnik 
v. McBride, supra note 4, at 355, 48 Sup. Ct. at 545; Williams v. Standard 
Oil Company, supra note 2, at 239-240, 49 Sup. Ct. at 116. See also Mr. 
Chief Justice Taft's quotation and explanation of this passage in Wolff 
Packing Company v. Court of Industrial Relations, supra note 27, at 540-
541, 43 Sup. Ct. at 634-5. 
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public use. But he sets up no test of construction; beyond public 
service industries his words offer no guidance; and it is hard 
to think of a competitive business which he would affect with a 
public interest. The net effect of his attempt to set up a "stan-
dard" is to permit regulation where an industry rests upon a 
franchise and to reject it where an act of dedication is not clearly 
shown. It is to make valid the concept in public utilities, where 
it is not wanted, and almost to exclude its use in competitive 
business _,,.here alone it is needed. 
It seems a far cry from the time of Lord Hale, when all traf-
ficking in wares was public, to that of :Mr. Justice Sutherland, 
when the theatre, the employment agency, and the roadside filling 
station are not affected with a public interest. But if Waite may 
look at Lord Hale's words and say what is in his mind, Mr. 
Justice Sutherland may endow Waite's words with a meaning 
of his own. A translation of a phrase is no novelty in law. And 
if the former jurist was moved by a desire to justify price-fixing 
and the latter to condemn it, it does not follow that they did 
different things. Each has merely read his own understanding 
into a highly receptive phrase. But neither has removed its 
vagueness, offered a principle to guide a court of law, or found a 
test by -.vhich the validity of price-fixing is to be measured. 
In spite of repeated attention neither the court nor any of its 
members has been able to reduce to specific terms the rule of 
affectation. ::\fr. Chief Justice Taft, insists that "the circum-
stances which clothe a particular kind of business with a public 
interest" must be "such as to create a peculiarly close relation 
between the public and those engaged in it, and raise an implica-
tion of an affirmative obligation on their part to be reasonable 
with the public;" 69 but he admits the lack of precision in such a 
test. :Mr. Justice Stone, after a survey of judicial usage, holds 
the phrase to be "too vague and illusory to carry us very far on 
our way to a solution," and concludes that the courts, instead of 
saying "public interest" and therefore price-control, make of it 
"a convenient expression for describing those business regula-
tions" i.vhich "have been permitted in the past." 10 t.Ir. Justice 
Holmes, who steadfastly refuses to use the concept, describes it 
as "little more than a fiction intended to beautify what is dis-
agreeable to the sufferers." :1 Even :Mr. Justice Sutherland, who 
finds it "the established test" by which the legislative power to 
fix prices is to be "measured," 72 admits that "the phrase is in-
definite." 73 
Gs Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, supra note 27, at 
536, 43 Sup. Ct. at 633. 
1~ Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, supra note 3, at 451, 47 Sup_ Ct. at 435. 
n Ibid. 446, 47 Sup. Ct. at 434. 
n Williams v. Standard Oil Co., supra note 2, at 239, 49 Sup. Ct. at 116. 
1'3 Mr. Justice McKenna, speaking for an earlier courl ,.,;th an "'ve n'llon 
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The plaill' truth is that here it is not argument that determines 
the direction in which argument moves. The legal reasons are 
but henchmen who do valiant service for the overlords of public 
policy; the real compulsions are presumptions clearly apparent 
in the thought of the majority of the court. An attempt to di-
vide an order of interlocking industries, each of which produces 
for the market, into "public" and "private" businesses is a par-
lous adventure. To justices who believe that "free contract" is 
the rule and regulation the exception, almost the whole of the 
domain of competition is marked off as private enterprise. And 
a regard for price as "the heart of the bargain" makes it pecu-
liarly immune to legislative control. These notions, a distinction 
between public and private within business enterprise, a belief 
in the efficacy of competition, and an elevation of price above 
"like terms" in a contract, lie at the basis of the constitutional 
principle recently· stated. They are within the judicial mind; 
and rules of law obey them. 
In the constitution the:re is usually more than one sanction; 
it is, therefore, of note that regulation which stops little short 
of price-fixing has been upheld without the formal affectation 
of business with a public interest. Statutes prescribing methods 
of wage-payment, the effect of which must have been substan-
tially to increase the laborer's income, have been held valid as 
general regulation.74 A federal regulation of the meat-packing 
industry has been upheld; 75 an order of the Secretary of Agricul-
ture prescribing "maximum charges" for "marketing agencies" 
at stock-yards has been held valid n by the court at its present 
term. It is explained that it is the rate of pay, not the total 
compensation, which is being regulated; for "there is here no at-
tempt to fix anyone's wages or to limit anyone's income," since 
"differences in skill, industry, and experience will continue to 
be factors'~ in "earning power." 77 In short, "the order fixes 
only the charges to be made in individual transactions." ~ 8 The 
the varied industrial scene, declares that "we can best explain by examples." 
Gennan Alliance Insurance Co. v. Kansas, supra note 50. 
a Knoxville Iron Company v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13, 22 Sup. Ct. 1 
(1901); McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 29 Sup. Ct. 206 (1909). 
75 Stafford '"· Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 42 Sup. Ct. 406 (1921). In as 
much as a Kansas statute regulating stock-yards was found void on other 
grounds, in Cotting v. Kansas, 183 U. S. 79, 22 Sup. Ct. 30 (1901), the 
court was not called upon to pass on thr qu•·:,tion of whether stock-y~orr!:.: 
were affected with a public intl'rest 
76 Tagg Bros. and Morehead \', l."nited States. 50 Sup. Ct. 220 ( t'. S. 
1930). 
7 ~ Ibid. 224. 
78 It was argued by counsel for the commission men that the Tyson and 
Ribnik cases held that there was in government no constitutional power 
to fix the prices of personal services. In reply Mr. Justice Brandeis, 
speaking for a unanimous court, says: "There is nothing in the nature 
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issue of public interest is avoided; 79 for the purpose of the regu-
lation is to prevent the charges of commission men from "be-
coming a burden upon, or obstruction of" interstate commerce. 
In the cases involving the prescription of minimum wages for 
women, the statutes applied to trades and industries generally; 
hence the question of public interest was not relevant. The Ore-
gon statute was upheld, or at least a declaration of constitu-
tionality by the Oregon Supreme Court ·was not reversed, a court 
of eight dividing evenly.50 The Act of Congress, applicable to 
the District of Columbia, was found invalid by a vote of five to 
three.81 In each case a minority of the court was ·willing to as-
sent to the validity of a limited price-fixing v.;thout affecting 
business with a public interest.~ Had the ninth justice sat in 
the Stettler case, or had the Adkins case been decided the other 
way, the issue would have.been resolved ·without benefit of Lord 
Hale's phrase. In that event a constitutional principle of public 
ip.terest could have been put to little further use. It may have 
been mere accident, it may have been cause; at least it has come 
about that it is for purposes of state, not of federal, legislation 
that industries are, or are not, to be affected with a public inter-
est. The doctrine is plainly to be found within the Fourteenth 
Amendment; as yet it has not been discovered ".;thin the FifthP 
In this history of the use of a phrase, there may or may not be 
a mystery. If time, place, and the changing court be left out of 
account; if the various decisions be set down side by side as if 
they belonged together; or if an attempt be made to run a thread 
of logical argument through the cases, puzzles may be made to 
abound. But a historical perspective \Vill give to the subject at 
of monopolistic personal services which makes it impoESible to fi.-.. reason-
able charges to be made therefor; and there is nothing in the Constitu-
tion which limits the Government's power of regulation to businesses which 
employ substantial capital!' Ibid. 224. 
79 The Tyson and Ribnik cases are rather neatly distinguiEhed by M:r. 
Justice Brandeis: "This Court did not hold in Tyson & Bro. "· Banton and 
Ribnik v. 1\IcBride that charges for personal service cannot be regulated. 
The· question upon which the Court divided in those cases was whether 
the services there sought to be regulated were then affected with a public 
interest.". Ibid. 224. The use of the word "then" is significant. 
so Stettler v. O'Hara, 243 U. S. 629, 37 Sup. Ct. 475 (1917). 
s1 Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394 (192.~). 
s: In neither of the cases did ~rr. Justice Brandeis sit, but his belief 
in the constitutionality of the minimum wage is well known. 
sa In Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298 (1917), the question 
was the constitutionality of the Adamson Act, which insured to many of 
the employes of railroads engaged in running trains the 't'.':lges for eight 
hours which before they had received for ten. The issue of public interest 
was not specifically raised. The result was reached by an e.'\'tension of 
the concept of interstate commerce to include industrial relations, the sup-
port of an emergency, and the concurrence of a member of the court who 
allowed himself to view the statute primarily as a regulation of hours. 
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least so much of order and sequence as the course of events can 
have. "In the two centuries and a half which separated Lord 
Hale's "rule of common law" from the "constitutional principle" 
of Mr. Justice Sutherland, an industrial system was trans-
formed; the problem of the control of economic activity was 
remade; a common sense gave way to its better or its worse; 
and even a common law came to be freshly interpreted. Lord 
Hale belongs to an age of authoritative nationalism; to him there 
is nothing unseemly in price control; ancient usage is not to 
be allowed to be forgotten. Waite is a disciple of Taney; the 
state may use its police power; general welfare in its many as-
pects must be served; the legislature must in general fix the 
limits of its own discretion. Mr. Justice Sutherland is a devotee 
to the creed of economic individualism. The seventeenth century 
rule is still accepted by the court as the guiding principle in 
cases of this character; but if the meaning has departed alike 
from Hale's phrase and from Waite's words, the result is due 
to the hazards of interpretation which not even constitutional 
law can escape. 
IV 
The adage, "apart it dies, related it lives," is true of a doc-
trine in the law. In the future, as in the past a control of prices 
under auspices of the state must run the gauntlet of the court's 
disapproval. But an attempt to determine in isolation a rule 
for the judicial tolerance of price regulation is certain to lead 
to bewilderment; a consideration of kindred doctrines will throw 
upon the matter the light of perspective. The question is to be 
approached as an aspect of the public policy for the control of 
industry. 
Here the beginning of wisdom is plain. Business is not above 
the law; the due process clause does not put price-making out 
of reach of the legislative hand. On the contrary, implicit with-
in statutes passed by the legislature and approved by the courts 
is to be found a policy of price-control as comprehensive as the 
domain of business. In the intent of the law, however imper-
fectly it may be realized in practice, all extortionate and unrea-
sonable prices are under the ban; in any industry the state may 
intervene for the protection of the public. As with other objec-
tives of policy, a price structure which is just and reasonable is 
to be attained by the use of a variety of means. Prices may be 
directly fixed, by statute or commission, as they are for gas, 
power, and rail carriage. The rate of return may be specified 
as it is for the use of money or the services of the live-stock 
broker. A monopoly may be dissolved, as in oil, tobacco, or 
timber, that business rivalry may strip from price its excess. 
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Each procedure is of its own kind; each works in its own way; 
but all are designed to secure the same la·wful result. 
Accordingly the constitutional issue is not the validity of the 
end, but the appropriateness of the means. The measures pro-
posed to bring prices under control, if they are to receive judicial 
approval, must be in accord with the picture of the structure 
of industry and the notions about the way in which it works 
held by the majority of the court. In their minds the ~vo clear-
cut classes of competition and monopoly divide industries be-
tween them. ·where free enterprise prevails, price-control is 
indirect; the state enforces competition and trusts to an open 
industry and a free market to establish rightful prices. Where 
an industry is closed, price-control is direct; the state undertakes 
to say what prices are fair to the parties concerned. The system 
of control may be set down as three presumptions, which are to 
be taken in order: price is to be left to free enterprise; the anti-
trust laws are to be used, if need be, to keep enterprise free; 
and, if free enterprise cannot be made to work, resort is to be 
had to formal price-fixing. 
The first presumption is that the making of price is to be 
left to whom it may concern. The rightful charge is to emerge 
as the result of the exercise of the right to freedom of contract 
by the interested parties. But one's freedom of contract is 
merely the right to participation in an organized market proce-
dure. A right of one's own to freedom of contract is cheeked by 
the freedom of one's competitors to contract and balanced b~· the 
freedom of contract on the part of those with whom one must 
do business. In simple terms, each person must make his living 
by selling his property or his services; each must live upon the 
goods and services produced by others. Each is free to produce 
and consume, sell and bul•. as he pleases. The only constraint is 
that in whatever one does-produce goods, sell labor, borrow 
money, or hawk wares-one must compete with others. The 
rivalry is a double competitive process, seller vying with seller 
and buyer with buyer. Because of rivalry in their ranks sellers 
cannot charge too much; and because of a like rivalry among 
buyers, they are allowed to charge enough. The result is that 
prices will have a basis in costs, unfair charges cannot continue 
to prevail, and in the long run only reasonable gains can be 
taken. It is not assumed that under free enterprise price is 
beyond public concern; rather it is presumed that the market 
gives adequate protection. 
Whenever enterprise ceases to be free, therefore, the matter 
becomes of public importance. The state may be called upon 
to keep an industry open to all who care to take its chances; 
it is to see to it that there is no collusion in the maintenance of 
prices. A proof of extortionate prices is not demanded; an 
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arbitrary control over them is enough to invite official action. 
For "the very power to fix prices," possessed by business rivals 
acting in concert, "involves power to control the market and to 
fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices." 84 Accordingly, the 
anti-trust laws ·are to be used to dissolve monopolies, to break 
up combinations, and to prevent trade associations from entering 
into price-fixing agreements. If the state goes no further, it is 
because it is deemed unnecessary. For, behind the policy is the 
belief that if competitive conditions are restored, economic forces 
acting of themselves and by themselves may be depended upon 
to establish rightful prices. The state does its task and leaves 
to the market what it may the better accomplish. 
But if this program does not suffice, the state may use more 
extreme measures. Certain "natural monopolies" and businesses 
which operate by exclusive franchise must be recognized as a 
class apart; the province of monopolistic industry is to be nar-
rowly limited. Here buyers or sellers are not protected by 
competition between those with whom they must deal, and the 
state must accord the protection which in the usual case the 
market is supposed to afford. Accordingly the state may resort 
directly to price-fixing. So firmly embedded in the law is the 
notion of fair price that public enterprise may be made to serve 
the end.85 If the legislature deems it wise, a state may enter 
an industry, and by direct competition with private concerns 
force price down to a reasonable charge.56 
If it has been difficult to secure from the court an approval of 
measures of price-control that lie beyond this simple program, 
it is because the picture of the industrial system which prevails 
reveals no proper place for them. But the economic order is 
rapidly changing; as our knowledge of its structure and its 
operation grows, our conceptions of how it works are subject 
to amendment or replacement. A more intricate and better un-
derstood industrial world no longer is to be resolved by clear-cut 
lines into the provinces of competition and monopoly; elements 
of the t\vo are combined in endless permutations in various 
businesses; in reference to any one of a dozen great industries it 
84 U. S. v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U. S. 392, 397, 47 Sup. Ct. 376, 379 
(1927). 
85 Jones v. City of Portland. 245 U. S. 171, 38 Sup. Ct. 112 (1917): 
Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233, 40 Sup. Ct. 499 (1920). 
86 It is interesting to compare the way of the TE-nnessee legislature, which 
attempted to regulate the price of gasoline, with that of the Lincoln City 
Council, which attempted to secure a r~asonable price by a public com-
petition with private dealers. The Tennessee statute was found invalid, 
Williams v. Standard Oil Co., supra note 2; the Lincoln City ordinance 
was upheld by the state supreme court, Standard Oil Co. v. City of 
Lincoln, 114 Neb. 243, ajJ'd, 275 U. S. 504, 48 Sup. Ct. 155 (1927). See 
KEEZER A!\'D MAY, op. cit. supra note 21, at 184-196. 
HeinOnline  -- 39 Yale L. J. 1109 1929-1930
1930] AFFECTATION WITH PUBLIC INTEREST 1109 
would be difficult to say whether monopoly or competition is 
the more appropriate word. The competitive system is no 
longer to be regarded as an automatic, self-regulating mechan-
ism; 87 like any other human institution it may work poorly, 
indifferently, or well: it produces very different results in differ-
ent industries. In its wake may come disorder as well as order, 
waste as well as efficiency, unfair as well as reasonable prices.as 
The price-structure in a competitive, as well as in a monopoly in-
dustry, may become disorderly; the maladjustment of its prices 
may become equally a matter of public concern.130 A simple device 
of direct price control may be an effective substitute for the 
indirection of preventing restraint of trade.l'0 The hazards of 
price regulation may well be smaller than those incident to an 
enforce,Jllent of the anti-trust acts. A newer and more realistic 
cbnception of competition suggests, not a new end for public 
policy, but another means for reaching a recognized end. 
The decisions of the courts have not been untouched by such a 
conception of the industrial order. The argument that competi-
tion makes for disorder as well as for order has been ably pre-
sented by the minority of the cou1t; 01 in even the more 
conservative opinions there is a recognition of the complexity 
of industrial activity and of differences between industries.ll: 
The realization that a measure of cooperative action may make 
competition more orderly lies at the basis of the larger toJerance 
allowed to trade associations.93 An attempt to prevent unfair 
s; HENDERSON, SUPPLY A:-."D DEMAND (1922). 
ss SOULE, THE USEFUL ART OF ECONOMICS (1929); HA!.tiLTON A..'\"D 
WRIGHT, THE CASE OF BITU::.UNOUS CoAL (1925) ; STOCKING, THE OIL IN-
DUSTRY AND THE CO!Ill'El'lTIVE SYSTE::.t (1925). 
89 WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD, BULLETIN OF MONTHLY PRICES DURING THE 
WAR. A typical presentation of the ups and downs of prices is LEsHER, 
PrucES oF CoAL A~"D CoKE. 
9o The operation of the anti-trust acts offers a study in law enforcement. 
An increasing number of persons, whose careful studies entitle their 
opinions to cons.ideration, regard them as a crude, indirect, wasteful, and 
inefficient method of protecting the public against unreasonable prices. 
The hazards that lie between the end of preserving competition and its 
attainment by resort to law are worthy of study. For statistics on en-
forcement see Letter from the Attorney General, March 11, 1926, AD!.tlNlS-
TRATION °0F THE SHER!IIAN ANTlTRUST Acr, SEN. Doc. No. 79, 69th Cong. 
1st Sess. 
91 Mr. Justice Brandeis, in American Column and Lumber Company v. 
United States, 257 U.S. 377, 418, 42 ~up. Ct. 114, 123 (1921). 
92 Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, supra note 27, at 
539, 43 Sup. Ct. at 634. 
93 Jlrl:aple Flooring l\Ianufacturers Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 
586, 45 Sup. Ct. 592 (1925) ; Cement Manufacturers' Protection Ass'n v. 
United States, 268 U. S. 588, 45 Sup. Ct. 592 (1925). 
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trade practices 94 has committed the government to establishing 
a "plane .of competition," 95 or setting up rules of the game for 
the business struggle.96 One by one matters once left to be 
determined by the market have been lifted out of the province 
of free bargaining and have been entrusted to public authority. 
The right of the state to regulate the hours of labor and the 
quality of the ware even in competitive industries is now clearly 
establish~. A large province of industrial activity is under 
the joint sovereignty of the market and the state. 
The same realistic conception of competition needs to be ap-
plied to the problem of price control. If free enterprise may 
fail to establish a working day which is not too long or to insure 
quality in wares offered for sale, it may fail in the making of 
prices. If, in matters like hours and quality, the state mar 
replace competition or help it over the hard places, it may b!! 
called upon to improve price performance. As a "term in a bar-
gain" 97 it invites the attention given to others; but it is enough 
after its own kind to demand distinctive legislation. In regard 
to hours, quality, compensation for accident, and the like, 
"standards" may be prescribed for industry in general; except 
for the minimum wage, price control must be accommodated 
to the requirements of particular businesses. It must be estab-
lished, instance by instance, as the occasion demands.98 A case 
for regulation must rest upon the presence of maladjustment,90 
the need for amendment, the relevancy of the remedy, and the 
promise of results.100 In short, price-fixing should be held valid, 
whenever "there is any combination of circumstances materially 
restricting the regulative force of competition, so that buyers 
or sellers are placed at such a disadvantage in the bargaining 
94 Through the Clayton Act of October 15, 1914, 38 STAT. 730, and the 
Federal Trade Commission Act of Sept. 26, 1914, 38 STAT. 717. 
95 For the concept of a plane of competition, see .ADAMS, THE RELATION 
OF THE STATE TO INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY (1887). 
96 Hills Bros. v. Federal Trade Commission, 9 F. (2d) 481 (C. C. A. 
9th, 1926), certiorari refused, 270 U. S. 662, 46 Sup. Ct. 471 (1925) ; 
Federal Trade Commission v. Baine, 23 F. (2d) 617 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928). 
97 Mr. Justice Stone, in Ribnik v. McBride, supra. note 4, at 374, 48 Sup. 
Ct. at 552. 
9 8 In as much as regulation must be adapted to particular industries, an 
issue of "classification" may possibly be raised. A court disposedo to look 
with hostility upon price regulation may find a potential storehouse of 
arguments in the "equal protection" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
It might easily be made to serve the purpose for which "public interest" 
is now employed. 
99 Maladjustment may be of many kinds and present many manifesta-
tions. 
100 The question is not, whether competition works, but whether its 
results measure up to the competitive ideal. See Rottschaeffer, The Field 
of Governmental Price Control (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 438, 452-460. 
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struggle that serious economic consequences result to a very 
large number of members of the community." 1c.,. 
Such a test is clearly in accord with a realistic picture of an 
intricate system of unlike and interrelated industries. It aban-
dons a simple categorical approach to a complicated industrial 
problem; it assumes no causal connection between a character-
istic of a business and a need for a legislative concern with its 
prices. The search for a "standard" is replaced by a pragmatic 
inquiry into necessity in each particular case. This approach 
makes an end of affectation, robs Public Interest of its capitals, 
removes from price regulation a superfluous constitutional haz-
ard, and restricts Lord Hale's meaning to what he actually said. 
The control of price, like autho1:ity in other industrial affairs, 
becomes a question of general regulation. It is to be approved 
or condemned, as are kindred legislative acts, by reference to 
the doctrine of police power.1.02 The legislation may be novel, 
for ways of getting things done must change with the times. But 
the constitutional test is· an established one; and the end of it 
all, the safeguarding of the public against unreasonable prices, 
goes back to ancient law. 
In subjecting the price-structure of an industry to control, 
the division of labor between the legislature and the court seems 
clearly marked. The discretion must belong to the law-making 
body, a restrained power of review to the judiciary. To the 
primary question of the necessity for regulation the courts can-
not easily give a right answer. Their crowded dockets allow 
scant time for a consideration of matters of policy; the procedure 
of hearings and briefs does not guarantee that the significant 
issues will be adequately presented; it is difficult for members 
of the bench to conduct independent investigations. The ques-
tions which focus about need, a scheme of control, and e:...-pected 
performance are very intricate and highly technical. The role 
of the bench, if it is to be wisely constructive, must be one of 
studied tolerance. The court may doubtless impose a veto upon 
legislation which is clearly abitrary. It might insist that statutes 
rest upon adequate information, due deliberation, and careful 
contrivance of remedies. It might demand that the legislative 
record be spread before it and thus subject the procedure of 
the law-making body to a test of due process.103 ·A constitution 
which endures allows an accommodation of means to the chang-
101 Mr. Justice Stone, in Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, su.pro note 3, at 452, 
47 Sup. Ct. at 435. 
102 See Comment (1929) 39 Y.ALE L. J. 256. 
1o3 A subjection of legislative procedure to the test of due process is quite 
possible. In Wilson v. New, supra. note 83, Mr. Justice Day, in his dis-
senting opinion, objected to the lack of deliberation with which the 
Adamson Act was passed and suggested this test. 
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ing circumstances of industrial society. Its spirit makes of the 
court a judicial, not a legislative or an economic, body. 
All of this, needless to say, has no direct concern with the 
practical value of price regulation. A state may fix prices, 
supervise them, or control the conditions out of which they 
emerge; in attempting to make them less unruly, it may use the 
legislature, an office, or a commission. Its will may find effect 
in a number of schemes, in which elements of price-control are 
variously fitted together. A trade association might be permitted 
to regulate prices if an adequate check against extortion can. be 
contrived; a price board might, under public auspices, be set up 
within an industry; a council of representatives of buyers and 
sellers might settle the matter by collecth·e bargining. The or-
ganization of an industry, as well as its technology, invites dis-
covery and invention; new devices and procedures come along 
to enrich the art of price-making. And always, as a first chance 
and a last refuge, there is the market, which works at least as 
well as it works. It is difficult to select from a growing list of 
possibilities the schemes of price-control which offer the best 
chances of reasonable performance; the issues are not the easier 
because ·they are largely speculative. A preference among them 
is a risky adventure that runs far afield. Here a choice between 
alternative means towards the lawful end of reasonable prices 
must not be set down. An article must not presume to speak 
where the Constitution of the United States is silent. 
